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Abstract 
The participation of women in top-level corporate boards (or rather the lack of it) 
is subject to intense public debate. Several countries are considering legally 
binding quotas to increase the share of women on boards. Indeed, research on 
board diversity suggests positive effects of gender diverse boards on corporate 
governance and even firm performance. The mechanism through which these 
benefits materialize remain however mostly speculative. We study boards of 
directors in a large sample of listed companies in 15 European countries over the 
period 2003-2011 and find that female representation on firms’ non-executive 
boards is associated with reduced turnover and an increase in tenure of executive 
board members. An increase in the performance-turnover sensitivity of executives 
suggests that this effect may be explained by better monitoring practices rather 
than by less effective control or a “taste for continuity”.  
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1. Introduction 
Gender diversity in top corporate jobs is a central theme in the public debate on 
corporate governance reforms in recent years. The majority of European member states 
has implemented corporate governance reforms in particular aiming to improve board 
competences, monitoring and advising. The introduced requirements and 
recommendations address, for instance, director remuneration, disclosure and 
transparency rules, but also board composition concerning diversity and independence.  
The European Commission (2011a, 2011b), however, draws attention to the still 
prevalent gender-inequality in corporate boards and calls for further improving the 
gender balance on European boards by raising the number of women in economic 
decision-making positions. In response, a small number of European Member States 
have already taken steps to increase the proportion of women on the board or are 
considering imposing certain quotas (see Ahern and Dittmar, 2012 or Heidrick & 
Struggles, 2014 for an overview).  
Besides policy efforts to mitigate discrimination against women, an increasing 
number of firms voluntarily undertake specific actions to improve career opportunities 
for women and to increase gender equality on the top decision-making bodies 
(European Commission, 2011c; Gratton et al., 2007). Farrell and Hersch (2005) find 
arguments for a firm internal but also outside pressure to increase gender diversity.  
In the academic literature in the fields of corporate governance and finance a 
number of empirical studies deal with the relationship between certain board 
characteristics and corporate outcomes (see Joecks et al., 2013 for a summary). A 
separate stream of research focuses on gender differences in a variety of situations 
including risk attitude and other behavioral patterns (see Niederle, 2014 for a review). 
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The relationship between gender-diverse boards and corporate outcomes, however, is 
still largely speculative. On the one hand, gender diversity may contribute to better 
corporate governance through improved group-thinking (European Commission, 2011a) 
or women may adopt different leadership styles (McKinsey & Company, 2007) that 
translate into motivated employees and thus higher performance. 
On the other hand, gender diversity may facilitate better monitoring because 
women are less prone to engage in the “old boys network” which impedes independent 
control of executives (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Insights from studies on the 
relationship between female representation on boards and firm performance are 
however ambiguous, some of them suggesting even negative performance effects 
(Rhode and Packel, 2014).  
This study adds to the debate on the link between gender-diverse boards and 
board performance by studying the relationship between non-executive board 
composition and the duration of executive board members. In particular, we examine 
the presence of monitoring and advising non-executive female directors on the board 
and their influence on both executive tenure and turnover. The study builds on a 
comprehensive dataset including more than 18,000 executive and non-executive 
directors in nearly all listed firms in 15 European member states in the period 2003 to 
2011. 
We estimate duration models and find that female non-executive directors on the 
board decrease executive turnover. Further analysis also shows a positive association of 
gender diversity with executives’ tenure measured by years in office. In order to assess 
the mechanism behind his result, we test whether the share of non-executive female 
directors on the board is associated with a higher performance-turnover sensitivity of 
executives. The results support this and therefore indicate that the punishment of 
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executive board members for weak performance is stronger in more diverse boards. 
While the first finding may also be explained by a “taste for continuity” of female board 
members or weak punishment of bad performance, the results point to better monitoring 
through female non-executive directors or higher advising competences reducing the 
risk of turnover and leading to prolonged terms in office. These results are robust to 
several estimation techniques and definitions of the sample. 
Further, while women on the executive board exhibit significantly lower tenure 
themselves, we cannot confirm that they face a higher risk of turnover. Finally, the 
presence of women as non-executives is not associated with higher (nor lower) financial 
performance suggesting that the link between female board representation and financial 
performance is not direct, but may materialize in the longer-run through its effect on 
management practices. 
While these results suggest that gender-diverse boards may be indeed beneficial, 
they do not advocate gender quotas. With the exception of Norway no country had 
implemented a quota during the period investigated here and it is not ex-ante clear that 
enforced diverse teams would show the same effects. More importantly, these results 
stress that it is in the self-interest of firms to aim for gender diversity in the boardroom 
if it facilitates better monitoring with potential long-run beneficial effects on corporate 
governance and eventually firm performance.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the 
relevant literature and develop our hypotheses. In section 3 we introduce the data, 
briefly review the different legal and institutional frameworks in the countries covered 
by this study and provide first descriptive findings. In section 4 we describe the 
methodology and present empirical results on the influence of monitoring and advising 
female directors on the board on executive duration and failure. Section 5 concludes and 
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gives an outlook on further research in the field. 
2. Board of Directors in Corporate Governance Literature 
2.1. Board Diversity and Corporate Governance  
Responding to public pressure, Norway was one of the first European countries to 
introduce a legally binding 40% quota for female representation on supervisory boards 
of stock companies which became effective in January 2008. Likewise, France and 
Spain have decided to increase the percentage of women on the board to 40% via 
quotas. Germany, so far relying on voluntary commitments, is also shifting towards a 
quota rule for supervisory boards in listed corporations. In other countries, the decision 
to adopt legal quotas is pending or still discussed (see Ahern and Dittmar, 2012 for an 
overview). Besides ethical and social reasons, legislators justify these initiatives based 
on the view that more gender-diverse boards improve corporate governance.  
Previous research indeed suggests that the composition and structure of the board 
of directors matters for corporate governance (see Adams et al., 2010 for a survey). 
Different theories have been used to explain the presence of women on the board and 
their influence on corporate behavior and outcomes (see Terjesen et al., 2009 for a 
comprehensive summary). In the specific case for gender diverse boards, arguments 
range from tapping a broader talent pool (Higgs, 2003) to the theory that women who 
are not part of the “old boys club” perform better in the role as independent supervisor. 
Women usually exhibit fewer social ties to established male directors making them 
more likely to increase board independence (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). It is also 
argued that women on the board increase its human and social capital as directors are 
recruited from a broader talent pool (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Women may therefore 
contribute to enhance diversity of experiences, knowledge and opinions in the 
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boardroom (Terjesen et al., 2009). Research, however, also shows that women are more 
risk-averse than men (e.g. Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009 or Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007) which may affect decision making in positive as well as adverse 
ways. Moreover, critical mass theory postulates that gender diversity improves team 
efficiency solely if a certain threshold is reached (Kanter, 1977a, 1977b or Schwartz-
Ziv, 2013 for a discussion). 
Existing empirical studies on the relationship between board or top management 
gender diversity and corporate performance yield ambiguous findings (Rhode and 
Packel, 2014). Adams and Ferreira (2009) who investigated almost 2,000 US firms 
during 1996 to 2003 find that female directors impact board inputs like higher 
attendance and monitoring-related committee assignments as well as CEO turnover and 
compensation. On the other hand, it is argued that “tokenism”, i.e. appointing a flagship 
female director, may have no significant impact on the companies that employ them. 
Francoeur et al. (2008) report that firms with a high proportion of female 
executive officers generate higher abnormal returns while the participation of female 
directors does not yield significant performance differences. Weber and Zulehner 
(2010) find evidence that gender diversity in leading positions reduces the risk of firm 
exits in the case of start-ups. Schwartz-Ziv (2013) identifies significant higher 
performance if at least three male and female directors are simultaneously present on 
the board.  
In contrast, there are studies pointing to adverse effects such as Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) who find a negative effect of gender diversity on firm performance. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) even show that the introduction of a quota for women on the 
board caused a reduction of stock market performance in Norwegian firms. Similar, 
Haslam et al. (2010) find a negative relation between market-based performance 
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measures but not for accounting-based measures. Bøhren and Staubo (forthcoming) find 
evidence that the gender quota in Norway leads to inefficient organizational forms and 
boards.  
A possible explanation for the contradictory evidence may be the fact that a 
number of unobserved factors affect both firm performance and the composition of the 
board. Another concern is the problem of reverse causality for the case that firm 
performance might also determine board composition (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003 for a discussion).  
Therefore, firm performance may only be affected in the very long-run via board 
performance and improved governance. Given the limitations to directly evaluate the 
relationship between board characteristics and firm performance, we address in the 
following the question as the extent to which the structure of the board rather affects its 
behavior. 
2.2. Executive Turnover as an Indicator of Effective Corporate Governance 
From an academic, management and policy point of view it is of high interest to 
analyze specific board behavior as a function of certain board characteristics. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) argue that a respective approach is more direct than focusing on 
firm performance. The idea is that board characteristics determine its actions, which in 
turn affect firm outcomes. Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates this rationale 
graphically. In addition to factors such as M&A activity or director remuneration, 
executive turnover is a relevant indicator for effective governance representing the 
ability of monitoring directors to discipline (underperforming) managers. Research in 
the field of corporate governance, finance or management increasingly pays attention to 
factors influencing executive turnover or succession. For instance, Yermack (2004) 
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shows that turnover is lower for outside directors compared to executives. In addition, 
outside directors increase the likelihood of external succession (Balsmeier et al., 2013; 
Borokhovich et al., 1996; Huson et al., 2001). Balsmeier et al. (forthcoming) find a 
substitutive relationship between capital control and outside directors with regard to 
executive turnover. Gregory-Smith et al. (2009) show that the risk of forced departures 
decreases from the fifth year in office indicating that CEOs are more likely to entrench 
themselves with ongoing tenure.  
A number of studies address the influence of certain board characteristics on the 
sensitivity of executive turnover to corporate performance (e.g. Dahya et al., 2002; 
Jenter and Kanaan, 2014; Kaplan and Minton, 2006). Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
develop a theoretical model and argue that CEO turnover is more sensitive to 
performance when the board is more independent (see also Laux, 2008). However, the 
sensitivity is lower if the majority of outside directors on the board hold three or more 
parallel directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Weisbach (1988) documents higher 
sensitivity of turnover to performance in outsider dominated boards. Goyal and Park 
(2002) find evidence for a lower sensitivity in the case of CEO-chairman duality. 
Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs following 
low performance. Faleye (2007) reports that classified board increase managerial 
entrenchment as they reduce involuntary CEO exits and the performance-turnover 
sensitivity.  
In the present study we aim to contribute to the existing literature by linking 
questions of gender diversity with regard to board composition and executive turnover. 
In particular, we are interested in the relationship between the presence of monitoring 
and advising non-executive women in the boardroom and their influence on fluctuation 
and tenure of executive directors in European listed firms. 
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2.3. Gender Diversity and Executive Turnover 
From a theoretical perspective, the anticipated effects of female directors on 
executive duration are ambiguous and call for empirical testing. On the one hand one 
might argue that women are weaker monitors as they may be subordinated in relation to 
their male board colleagues and are less likely to speak up in case things go wrong. 
Critical mass theory therefore suggests that a low number of female directors restricts 
their potential to perform effectively (Kanter, 1977a; Schwartz-Ziv, 2013) resulting in a 
lower ability of the entire board to monitor adequately. If women are characterized by a 
“taste for continuity” or are more risk-averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007) they may be more likely be associated with lower fluctuation rates of 
their executives. The same relationship could be explained by human capital theory if 
non-executive monitoring and advising female directors increase experiences and 
knowledge in the boardroom. On the other hand, it is also plausible to assume that 
women are tougher monitors because they are more independent as they have less 
personal or social relationships to the incumbent executives, for example shared career 
paths. Previous empirical findings support the latter explanation. For instance, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) find for a sample of US firms that gender-diverse boards have 
higher monitoring competences. Further, women on the board increase the 
performance-turnover sensitivity of their CEO (similar Schwartz-Ziv, 2013 for a smaller 
sample).  
3. Data and Descriptive Findings 
For the following empirical investigation, we matched information from different 
private databases. The initial population is based on the “Officers & Directors” database 
provided by Thomson Reuters which contains detailed individual information on 
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executive and non-executive directors on the boards of stock-market listed firms. 
Thomson Reuters allocates an individual identification number to each executive 
enabling us to track executives’ spells over time. Within the framework of our analysis, 
we focus on firms in 15 different Western European countries.  
In a next step, we merged supplementary financial and ownership data from the 
“ORBIS” database provided by Bureau van Dijk based on the ISIN number. As 
subsidiaries are controlled by national or global parent companies and executive 
turnover and tenure are likely to be influenced by the ultimate owner, all majority-
owned subsidiaries were removed from the sample. Furthermore, firms operating in the 
sector of financial intermediation were excluded from the sample. Following this 
approach and after eliminating observations with incomplete records our final panel 
includes information for 18,456 executives from 3,369 different firms yielding 62,068 
person-year observations in the period 2003 to 2011.
1
  
In contrast to monistic board structures in Anglo-Saxon countries, firms in a 
number of European member states are characterized by two-tiered boards. Monistic or 
unitary boards consist of a single body with executive directors who are in charge of the 
day-to-day business and non-executive directors who appoint, monitor and advise the 
management in strategic decision-making, define the scale of compensation and dismiss 
members of the management board. In contrast, dualistic boards have a separated 
supervisory board with non-executive directors and an executive or management 
committee (see Figure A1 in the appendix). European firms received the option to 
implement a single-tier administrative board or a two-tiered board structure (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
Company). In the following, we therefore distinguish between executive and non-
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executive directors, a distinction that can be applied for all countries.  
Table I provides the pooled descriptive statistics.
2
 We use return on assets (ROA) 
as a measure of financial performance.
3
 Following Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) Block is 
used as a proxy for ownership concentration which takes a value of 1 if at least one 
shareholder holds 25 % or a higher fraction of the voting rights. Firm leverage is 
measured by the Debt Equity Ratio. Further, we use the number of Employees as a 
proxy for firm size. To account for the possible influence of board size on executive 
turnover we include both the number of executive (No. Executives) and non-executive 
(No. Non-Executives) directors in the estimations.
4
 To investigate the influence of 
female representation on the non-executive board on executive duration we use three 
different indicators: the total number of women, a dummy variable indicating at least 
one female director and the fraction of non-executive female directors. With regard to 
the individual characteristics of executive directors, we observe 9 % women among the 
executive directors in the sample (Gender). The average Tenure of the executives is 4.5 
years. Further, we observe 6,724 Failure events, meaning that about one third of the 
individual spells end during the sample period. Due to data restrictions, we obtained 
information on executives’ Age for less than 50 % percent of all observation. For this 
subsample, average age amounts to 48.9 years. 
 (Table I: Descriptive statistics) 
                                                                                                                                               
1
 Tables A2 A3 in the appendix illustrate the pooled distribution by country and industry. 
2
 Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the description of the variables and its sources. 
3
 Alternative accounting- and market-based performance measures (not reported) like return on equity, 
return on capital employed or Tobin’s q yielded similar results. As accounting indicators of 
performance are better predictors of management turnover than stock price performance Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003), we focus on the former, measured by ROA. 
4
 It has to be mentioned that the figures reported for board size in table I deviate from previous studies 
(e.g. Heidrick & Struggles (2014). This is because the latter usually focus on a sample of the top 
publicly listed firms in each country while we account for all listed firms including Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). In some cases the figures refer to the extended management board. 
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The presence of non-executive female directors on the board is displayed in 
Figure I. The upper part (a) of the figure represents the percentage of women on all 
director appointments whose participation almost doubled from 10.6 percent in the year 
2003 to 20.8 percent in 2011. Thereafter, shown in part (b) of the figure, the fraction of 
women on all non-executive directors on the board increased from 7.2 percent to 11.4 
percent in the same period whereby the development differs between countries. 
The lower part of the figure illustrates that the share of firms with at least one 
female non-executive director steadily increased from 0.34 in 2003 to 0.46 in 2011, 
while the share of firms with exactly on female non-executive director remained 
virtually unchanged at an average level of around 0.25. The diverging trends suggest 
that the increase of non-executive directors in our sample period is not driven by 
“tokenism”. 
(Figure I: Fraction of female directors on the board) 
The state and development of female non-executive directors on the country-level 
is summarized in Figure II showing substantial differences among the different 
countries in the observed period 2003 to 2011. For instance, in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland the fraction seems to remain almost stable on a low level. In contrast, for 
Norway the table clearly shows the significant increase before the quota of 40 percent 
became effective in the year 2008.  
(Figure II: Fraction of female non-executive directors by country) 
Table II shows the mean comparisons on the firm-level for the group of firms 
                                                                                                                                               
In the case of CEO-chairman duality in mixed board structures we allocate the respective directors to 
the group of executive directors to avoid double-counting. 
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without and with at least one female non-executive director on the board.
5
 We find that 
firms with gender-diverse boards produce significantly higher returns, are larger, 
measured by employees, and are characterized by a larger number of both executive and 
non-executive directors. 
(Table II: Mean comparisons) 
4. Methodological Remarks and Regression Results 
4.1. Methodology 
We use semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard estimations to analyze the 
factors that influence executive turnover. Compared to probit or logit models, this 
approach offers several advantages. In the following, we briefly illustrate the 
econometric setup (see e.g. Greene, 2003; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002 for a detailed 
introduction). 
In the model T denotes a random variable describing the duration of the executives on 
the management board and t is the realization of T. The random variable t follows the 
function F(t) with an unknown distribution. The survival function S(t)=1–F(t) denotes 
the probability that an individual spell lasts at least until t. The hazard rate measures the 
probability that an ends after duration t given that it lasted at least until period t and is 
defined as: (t)=f(t)/S(t). The respective survival and hazard curves for the group of 
executive female and male directors are displayed in Figure III. 
(Figure III: Gender-specific hazard and survival rates of executive directors) 
The Cox proportional hazard model considers a baseline hazard 0(t) representing 
individual heterogeneity and a vector of covariates X of individual i. The model 
                                                 
5
 The correlation coefficients are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
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specifies that the hazard rate is multiplicatively proportional to the general baseline 
hazard and the individual explanatory variables: (t, X)= 0(t) e
(X)
.
6
 The parameter 
vector  is estimated using maximum likelihood. The obtained hazard rate is a function 
of the covariates that may increase or reduce the baseline hazard. 
The Cox model is an appropriate approach to handle left-censored data (the start 
date of a spell is unknown) and right-censored data (the end of a spell is unknown). 
Further, the semi-parametric model does not require assumptions concerning the 
distribution of the function F(t). As we are interested in the factors determining both 
executives’ turnover and tenure in office, we exclusively focus on the cases with a 
reported historical start date and therefore set aside left-censoring.  
In addition to duration models, we can estimate executive tenure measured by the 
number of years in office. In that case, executive tenure is non-negative integer value 
larger than or equal to one. Therefore we can specify count data models when we 
investigate the factors determining executives’ time in office. The tenure function in its 
most general form is then given by: 
                        'it it it it i it it iE Y | Z ,X ,c exp Z X c                                (1) 
where Yi is the count of years in office, Zit is the share of female board members, and Xit 
represents the set of controls including eight time and 14 country dummies. Parameters 
 and  are to be estimated. Individual-specific, time-constant, unobserved effects are 
captured by ci. By introducing an unobserved effect explicitly, a random effects analysis 
typically accounts for the overdispersion and serial dependence assumptions 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 672). 
                                                 
6 We tested the proportionality condition for all model specifications using χ2-tests on the basis of 
Schoenfeld residuals (Hosmer et al., 2008). Since all test results, for each explanatory variable and the 
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4.2. Empirical Findings 
Table III reports the results of Cox proportional hazard regressions for different 
model specifications. The basic model (a) shows the coefficients of the different 
variables excluding indicators for gender diversity. We find no significant link between 
firm performance and executive turnover. In firms with a blockholder, executives’ risk 
to leave the board is significantly lower. We also find weak evidence for a negative 
relationship between firm debt and executive turnover. Further, the hazard rates are 
lower in larger firms, measured by employees. Executive turnover is significantly 
higher in larger management boards. 
In specifications (b), (c) and (d) we include different indicators of gender diversity 
among non-executive directors: in model (b) we control for the total number of female 
non-executive directors, model (c) includes a dummy indicating at least one non-
executive female director on the board and model (d) accounts for the fraction of female 
directors among all non-executive directors on the board. All estimations show that 
gender diversity significantly reduces the likelihood of executive turnover. It should be 
noted that we also tested for whether the presence of exactly one female non-executive 
board member has a similar effect. Interestingly, this variable does not turn out to be 
significant pointing to the conclusion that it is the extent of gender diversity (number or 
share), not the presence of a single female person that affects executive tenure (see 
Table A5a). 
(Table III: Cox proportional hazard regressions of executive turnover) 
The previous analysis has shown that executives face a lower risk of turnover if 
                                                                                                                                               
global tests confirm that the flexible semi-parametric Cox models is applicable, we do not report 
parametric models, i.e. probit estimations which yielded similar results. 
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women are appointed as non-executive directors on the board. In Table IV we focus on 
executives’ tenure, measured by the years they stay in office. In the table we repeat 
specifications (b) to (d) from Table III, except the dependent variable now refers to 
executive tenure. In line with the previous results we find that gender diversity among 
the non-executive directors increases executives time in office.
7
 We also find that 
female executive directors exhibit significantly lower tenures. This finding reflects the 
trend that a relative high number of female directors have been appointed to the board 
during the last years while the majority of board positions are still occupied by longer-
tenured male directors.
8
 
 (Table IV: Poisson regressions of executive tenure in office) 
So far, the results may either point to higher advising competences of female non-
executive directors but could also reflect weak monitoring. To discriminate between 
both possible explanations we address the role of women for the performance-turnover 
sensitivity of executives and in the case of unexpected turnover events as additional 
robustness checks. 
4.3. Further Robustness Tests 
4.3.1. Performance-Turnover Sensitivity 
In Table V we include an interaction term between the three gender-indicators and 
firm performance. While the interaction between non-executive female directors on the 
board and different continuous performance measures is insignificant, we obtain 
significant results when we use a dummy variable indicating below-average returns. We 
                                                 
7
 Similar to Table A5a we find no significant influence of a dummy indicating exactly one woman among 
non-executive directors on executive tenure (not reported). 
8
 These findings are robust to different distributional assumptions. See Table A5b for the results from a 
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find that below-average performance significantly increases the risk of executive 
turnover. Further, while women still reduce the propensity of executive turnover the 
interaction with the below-average performance is positive indicating that firms with 
(more) female directors exhibit higher performance-turnover sensitivities. In line with 
the findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) the results support the assumption that 
female non-executive directors contribute to improve the monitoring intensity. 
(Table V: Performance-turnover sensitivity) 
4.3.2. Unexpected Turnover 
It might be objected that, in our previous empirical analyses, we treated all exit 
events equally. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that hazard rates differ for 
different replacement decisions, for instance regular resp. voluntary exits or unexpected 
turnover (Gregory-Smith et al., 2009). To account for the influence of women on the 
board on different types of executive turnover, in particular departures following 
dismissals or forced turnover, we perform additional robustness tests.  
Forced departures, even for CEOs (Balsmeier et al., 2013; Parrino, 1997 or 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), are hardly to identify because firms generally do not 
publish announcements that an executive has been dismissed. Therefore we use 
executives’ age as a simple proxy for forced or unexpected turnovers. We argue that the 
observed executives in the data have reached a top-management position and therefore 
usually do not resign voluntarily before retirement age. Following this reasoning, we 
consider exclusively exit events below retirement age.
9
 Further, we corrected for 
                                                                                                                                               
negative binomial model. 
9
 We refer to an age threshold of 62 years to indicate retirement age. We repeated the estimations using 
alternative age limits that yielded similar results. Following Parrino et al. (2003) we controlled for an 
alternative limit of 60 years. Further, we used different typical age thresholds for German firms such 
as 60, 62 or 65 years, as mentioned in the literature (e.g. Ringleb et al., 2010). Yermack (1996) refers 
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executives who move to a non-executive position in the same firm. Due to a lack of 
available data with respect to executives’ age this approach leads to a reduction to 7,956 
different spells. The results in Table VI reveal that the previous findings remain 
qualitatively unchanged in the reduced sample. The interaction term remains significant 
at the 5 resp. 10 percent level in all specifications with a stronger magnitude of the 
covariates in the subsample of unexpected turnover events supporting the view that 
female non-executive directors increase the monitoring competences of the board. 
 (Table VI: Cox proportional hazard regressions of unexpected executive turnover) 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
This study provides support for the role of non-executive board composition of 
executive turnover in European listed companies. For a large sample of boards and 
directors in more than 3,000 different companies in 15 European countries over the 
period 2003 to 2011, we observe an increase in female board members. The raises 
questions regarding the impact of more gender diverse boards on corporate governance 
and eventually firm performance. 
Building on previous work such as by Adams and Ferreira (2009) who found the share 
of female board members to affect various measures of governance in US firms, we add 
to these insights by pointing to a positive correlation between gender diverse boards and 
executive turnover. Research has long stressed that lower executive turnover may 
benefit corporate governance and promote performance in the long-run. While it is not 
a-priory clear that gender diversity increases executive duration as a result of better 
governance, our observation that gender diversity is also associated with a higher 
                                                                                                                                               
to 64, 65 and 66 years as regular retirement ages for CEOs. Also an age threshold of 70 years yielded 
similar results (e.g. Fahlenbrach et al., 2013). 
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performance-turnover sensitivity of executives suggests that diversity may improve 
monitoring and hence reduce executive drop-out. In line with several previous studies, 
when controlling for other performance drivers, we do not find any significant impact of 
companies’ short-run financial performance. These results also point to the conclusion 
that the effect from increasing the share of women in corporate boards will (at least) not 
immediately translate into measurable financial performance.  
It is important to stress, that while these results suggest that gender-diverse boards 
may be indeed beneficial for board stability, they do not advocate gender quotas. On the 
contrary, these results suggest that it may be in the self-interest of companies to aim for 
gender diversity in the boardroom if it facilitates better monitoring with potential long-
run beneficial effects on corporate governance.  
Although this study provided an attempt to identify the mechanism through which 
gender diversity affects executive tenure, we encourage more research on pinning down 
the behavioral factors that may explain this outcome. Experimental studies explicitly 
testing for gender differences in monitoring may allow to conclude whether the 
observed patterns are indeed due to better monitoring and conflict resolution or due to 
alternative explanations such as female taste for continuity. Alternatively, longer 
executive duration may be explained by too weak punishment of executive board 
members in case of conflicts. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table I: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm Characteristics (No. Firms: 3,369)         
Return on Assets 17,073 1.27 11.42 -61.52 26.89 
ROA low 17,073 0.31 - 0 1 
Block 17,073 0.35 - 0 1 
Debt Equity Ratio 17,073 1.76 1.72 0.08 15.25 
Employees 17,073 10,099 37,587 1 639,904 
No. Executives 17,073 6.46 4.44 1 29 
No. Non-Executives 17,073 5.85 3.63 1 33 
No. Female Non-Executives 17,073 0.61 0.95 0 8 
Dummy Female Non-Executives 17,073 0.39 - 0 1 
Dummy One Female Non-Executive 17,073 0.25 - 0 1 
Fraction Female Non-Executives 17,073 9.20 14.34 0.00 100.00 
Individual Characteristics (No. Individuals: 18,456)       
Gender 62,068 0.09 - 0 1 
Tenure 62,068 4.47 3.94 1 44 
Failure 62,068 0.11 - 0 1 
Age 28,420 48.87 7.73 22 100 
 
21 
 
Table II: Mean comparisons 
 
Variable Total No One or More Mean Compari-
son t-Test 
Female Non-Executive Directors 
Return on Assets 1.27 0.70 2.15  -8.1120*** 
ROA low 0.31 0.33 0.27 7.2049*** 
Block 0.35 0.35 0.36 -1.4183 
Debt Equity Ratio 1.76 1.66 1.90  -8.9014*** 
Employees 10,099.30 4,689.31 18,470.98 -23.7788*** 
No. Executives 6.46 5.64 7.72 -30.6667*** 
No. Non-Executives 5.85 4.65 7.70 -58.7447*** 
Obs. 17,073 10,371 6,702   
 
22 
 
Table III: Cox proportional hazard regressions of executive turnover 
 
 
Model 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Return on Assets 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.96) (0.61) (0.42) (0.45) 
Block -0.229*** -0.224*** -0.191*** -0.242*** 
 
(-3.67) (-3.57) (-3.10) (-3.96) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.030* -0.042** -0.032* -0.040** 
 
(-1.71) (-2.42) (-1.88) (-2.31) 
Log Employees -0.432*** -0.370*** -0.381*** -0.369*** 
 
(-7.07) (-6.48) (-6.66) (-6.45) 
No. Executives 0.253*** 0.234*** 0.249*** 0.238*** 
 
(23.88) (22.88) (23.74) (23.04) 
No. Non-Executives -0.022 0.080*** 0.020 -0.014 
 
(-1.27) (4.42) (1.26) (-0.90) 
Gender -0.023 -0.025 -0.026 -0.029 
  (-0.55) (-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.67) 
No. Female Non-Executives 
 
-0.834*** 
  
  
(-22.10) 
  Dummy Female Non-Executives 
  
-1.035*** 
 
   
(-17.15) 
 Fraction Female Non-Executives 
   
-0.050*** 
        (-17.36) 
No. Spells 18,967 18,967 18,967 18,967 
No. Failures 6,724 6,724 6,724 6,724 
No. Observations 62,068 62,068 62,068 62,068 
Pseudo R
2
 0.048 0.072 0.060 0.066 
Log Likelihood -9,762 -9,510 -9,638 -9,572 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 19,538 19,035 19,291 19,159 
Stratified (firm-level) yes yes yes yes 
Global Test of PH Assumption (χ2) 5.60 4.91 4.18 4.80 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The 
dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk 
of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firm-
level. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table IV: Poisson regressions of executive tenure in office 
 
 
Model 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
Return on Assets 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(15.42) (15.55) (15.42) 
Block -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.31) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
(-4.94) (-5.03) (-5.05) 
Log Employees 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(4.20) (4.38) (4.24) 
No. Executives -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
(-4.82) (-4.91) (-4.83) 
No. Non-Executives -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 
(-7.64) (-6.87) (-6.70) 
Gender -0.148*** -0.144*** -0.147*** 
 
(-5.99) (-5.85) (-5.96) 
No. Female Non-Executives 0.038*** 
  
 
(4.57) 
  
Dummy Female Non-Executives 
 
0.040** 
 
  
(2.53) 
 
Fraction Female Non-Executives 
  
0.002*** 
   
(4.17) 
Constant 1.486*** 1.497*** 1.468*** 
 
(37.45) (37.76) (36.27) 
Joint sign. of time dummies χ2 (8) 328.50*** 355.12*** 335.39*** 
Joint sign. of industry dummies χ2 (16) 121.04*** 118.77*** 119.25*** 
Joint sign. of country dummies χ2 (14) 129.80*** 121.61*** 128.15*** 
No. Observations 62,068 62,068 62,068 
Log Likelihood -176,399 -176,485 -176,394 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive tenure. Clustered at the individual-level. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table V: Cox proportional hazard regressions of executive turnover: performance-
turnover sensitivity 
 
 
Model 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
ROA low 0.214*** 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.142*** 
 
(5.22) (3.24) (2.90) (2.85) 
Block -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.196*** -0.251*** 
 
(-3.71) (-3.69) (-3.17) (-4.08) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.046*** -0.060*** -0.049*** -0.057*** 
 
(-2.63) (-3.52) (-2.88) (-3.35) 
Log Employees -0.447*** -0.379*** -0.390*** -0.374*** 
 
(-7.33) (-6.61) (-6.79) (-6.50) 
No. Executives 0.252*** 0.232*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 
 
(23.85) (22.73) (23.54) (22.84) 
No. Non-Executives -0.023 0.080*** 0.020 -0.013 
 
(-1.29) (4.32) (1.24) (-0.86) 
Gender -0.020 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 
 
(-0.47) (-0.53) (-0.56) (-0.62) 
No. Female Non-Executives 
 
-0.857*** 
  
  
(-21.99) 
  No. Female Non-Ex. times ROA low 
 
0.092** 
  
  
(2.03) 
  Dummy Female Non-Executives 
  
-1.096*** 
 
   
(-16.86) 
 Dummy Female Non-Ex. times ROA low 
  
0.173** 
 
   
(2.23) 
 Fraction Female Non-Executives 
   
-0.053*** 
    
(-17.66) 
Fraction Female Non-Ex. times ROA low 
   
0.009*** 
        (2.64) 
No. Spells 18,967 18,967 18,967 18,967 
No. Failures 6,724 6,724 6,724 6,724 
No. Observations 62,068 62,068 62,068 62,068 
Pseudo R
2
 0.048 0.073 0.061 0.068 
Log Likelihood -9,752 -9,497 -9,624 -9,557 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 19,518 19,011 19,266 19,132 
Stratified (firm-level) yes yes yes yes 
Global Test of PH Assumption (χ2) 5.44 4.82 3.91 4.59 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The 
dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk 
of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firm-
level. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table VI: Cox proportional hazard regressions of unexpected executive turnover 
 
 
Model 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
ROA low 0.133* 0.052 0.086 0.089 
 
(1.95) (0.60) (0.88) (1.01) 
Block -0.148 -0.157 -0.123 -0.179* 
 
(-1.41) (-1.51) (-1.18) (-1.77) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.023 -0.048* -0.041 -0.042 
 
(-0.83) (-1.79) (-1.54) (-1.64) 
Log Employees -0.644*** -0.572*** -0.573*** -0.536*** 
 
(-5.99) (-5.68) (-5.53) (-5.23) 
No. Executives 0.182*** 0.162*** 0.175*** 0.166*** 
 
(12.60) (11.88) (12.16) (11.96) 
No. Non-Executives 0.005 0.127*** 0.040 0.005 
 
(0.16) (4.29) (1.60) (0.20) 
Gender -0.035 -0.043 -0.050 -0.043 
 
(-0.53) (-0.64) (-0.75) (-0.64) 
Log Age -0.719*** -0.679*** -0.736*** -0.676*** 
 
(-4.88) (-4.65) (-5.02) (-4.59) 
No. Female Non-Executives 
 
-0.926*** 
  
  
(-16.81) 
  No. Fem. Non-Ex times ROA low 
 
0.145** 
  
  
(2.22) 
  Dummy Female Non-Executives 
  
-1.372*** 
 
   
(-12.48) 
 Dummy Fem. Non-Ex times ROA low 
  
0.253* 
 
   
(1.95) 
 Fraction Female Non-Executives 
   
-0.070*** 
    
(-15.31) 
Fraction Fem. Non-Ex times ROA low 
   
0.009* 
        (1.75) 
No. Spells 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 
No. Failures 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,821 
No. Observations 28,420 28,420 28,420 28,420 
Pseudo R
2
 0.032 0.066 0.050 0.064 
Log Likelihood -3,987 -3,846 -3,913 -3,856 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 7,990 7,713 7,845 7,731 
Stratified (firm-level) yes yes yes yes 
Global Test of PH Assumption (χ2) 5.73 5.61 5.98 6.78 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The 
dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk 
of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firm-
level. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure I: Average proportion of non-executive female directors in the period 2003 
to 2011 
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Figure II: Fraction of female non-executive directors by country 
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Figure III: Gender-specific hazard and survival rates of executive directors 
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Supplementary material 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Firm Characteristics    
Return on Assets  = (net income after taxes / total assets) in percent Bureau van Dijk 
ROA low Dummy indicating whether firm performance is 
below the average industry-adjusted ROA 
Bureau van Dijk 
Block Dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest share-
holder owns at least 25 % of the capital stock  
Bureau van Dijk 
Debt Equity Ratio = (total assets - shareholders funds) / shareholders 
funds 
Bureau van Dijk 
Employees Number of employees (in thousands) Bureau van Dijk 
No. Executives Number of executives directors on the board ThomsonReuters 
No. Non-Executives Number of non-executives directors on the board ThomsonReuters 
No. Female Non-Executives Number of female non-executive directors ThomsonReuters 
Dummy Female Non-Executives Dummy indicating if at least one female non-
executive director is observed 
ThomsonReuters 
Dummy One Female Non-
Executive 
Dummy that equals 1 if one female non-executive 
director is observed 
ThomsonReuters 
Fraction Female Non-Executives Proportion of female non-executive directors ThomsonReuters 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender Dummy variable that equals 1 if an executive di-
rector is female 
ThomsonReuters 
Tenure Executives’ tenure in office in years ThomsonReuters 
Failure Dummy indicating if an executive director leaves 
the board 
ThomsonReuters 
Age Executives‘ age in years ThomsonReuters 
 
Notes: Bureau van Dijk: “ORBIS” database. ThomsonReuters: “Officers & Directors” database.
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Table A2: Pooled distribution by country 
 
Country Description No. Firms Observations Fraction Number Dummy Dummy One Fraction 
Female Non-Executive(s) 
1 Austria (AT) 50 259 1.52 0.41 0.36 0.31 5.21 
2 Belgium (BE) 79 348 2.04 0.57 0.37 0.25 7.30 
3 Switzerland (CH) 131 868 5.08 0.34 0.27 0.21 4.68 
4 Germany (DE) 456 2,194 12.85 0.56 0.33 0.20 5.64 
5 Denmark (DK) 75 404 2.37 0.68 0.46 0.29 8.82 
6 Spain (ES) 101 483 2.83 0.71 0.49 0.36 7.65 
7 Finland (FI) 93 689 4.04 0.84 0.55 0.40 10.86 
8 France (FR) 411 2,024 11.85 0.69 0.47 0.32 11.85 
9 United Kingdom (UK) 1,107 5,620 32.92 0.30 0.24 0.20 6.06 
10 Greece (GR) 166 752 4.40 0.64 0.44 0.32 13.05 
11 Ireland (IE) 58 285 1.67 0.45 0.38 0.33 6.38 
12 Italy (IT) 122 438 2.57 0.41 0.33 0.25 5.18 
13 Netherlands (NL) 112 637 3.73 0.31 0.25 0.21 5.26 
14 Norway (NO) 118 564 3.30 2.41 0.95 0.13 34.74 
15 Sweden (SE) 290 1,508 8.83 1.29 0.74 0.39 17.94 
Total   3,369 17,073 100.00 0.61 0.39 0.25 9.20 
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Table A3: Pooled distribution by industry 
 
  
Industry NACE Industry Code(s) Description No. Firms Observations % 
1 Agriculture and Mining 01-09 179 783 4.59 
2 Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 10-12 126 657 3.85 
3 Textiles 13-15 90 449 2.63 
4 Wood, Paper, Printing, Coke and Refined 
Petroleum 
16-19 103 581 3.40 
5 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
20 86 495 2.90 
6 Manufacture of Basic Pharmaceutical Products 21 129 630 3.69 
7 Rubber, Plastic and Other Non-metallic Minerals 22, 23 80 435 2.55 
8 Manufacture of Basic and Fabricated Metal 
(Products), except Machinery and Equipment 
24, 25 130 719 4.21 
9 Manufacture of Computer, Electrical Equipment, 
Electronic and Optical Products  
26, 27 332 1,811 10.61 
10 Machinery, Motor Vehicles, (Semi-)Trailers and 
Other Transport Equipment  
28-33 317 1,794 10.51 
11 Electricity, Gas, Steam, Water, Sewerage, Waste 
and Remediation Activities  
35-39 90 459 2.69 
12 Wholesale and Retail Trade, Accommodation 
and Food Service Activities  
45-47, 55-56 353 1,714 10.04 
13 Construction, Transporting and Storage  41-43, 49-53 209 1,176 6.89 
14 Publishing, Programming and Broadcasting, 
Telecommunications  
58-61 318 1,566 9.17 
15 Computer Programming, Consultancy, 
Information Service Activities 
62-63 249 1,180 6.91 
16 Real estate activities 68 171 805 4.72 
17 Other Service Activities 69-82 407 1,819 10.65 
 
Total  
 
3,369 17,073 100.00 
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Table A4: Correlation coefficients 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Return on Assets 1.00 
              
(2) ROA low -0.66 1.00 
             
(3) Block 0.00 0.02 1.00 
            
(4) Debt Equity Ratio -0.08 0.13 0.07 1.00 
           
(5) Employees 0.07 -0.10 -0.05 0.17 1.00 
          
(6) No. Executives 0.12 -0.10 0.03 0.06 0.26 1.00 
         
(7) No. Non-Executives 0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.15 0.46 0.30 1.00 
        
(8) No. Female Non-Executives 0.09 -0.08 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.49 1.00 
       
(9) Dummy Female Non-Executives 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.42 0.76 1.00 
      
(10) Dummy One Female Non-Executive 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.66 1.00 
     
(11) Fraction Female Non-Executives 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.81 0.78 0.28 1.00 
    
(12) Gender 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.07 1.00 
   
(13) Tenure 0.09 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.05 1.00 
  
(14) Failure -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 1.00 
 
(15) Age 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.29 0.05 1.00 
 
Notes: The table presents the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the study (n = 62,068. Correlation coefficients regarding executives’ age: n = 28,420).
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Table A5a: Cox proportional hazard regressions of executive turnover  
 
 
Model 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Return on Assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.61) (0.42) (0.96) (0.45) 
Block -0.224*** -0.191*** -0.229*** -0.242*** 
 
(-3.57) (-3.10) (-3.65) (-3.96) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.042** -0.032* -0.030* -0.040** 
 
(-2.42) (-1.88) (-1.71) (-2.31) 
Log Employees -0.370*** -0.381*** -0.432*** -0.369*** 
 
(-6.48) (-6.66) (-7.07) (-6.45) 
No. Executives 0.234*** 0.249*** 0.253*** 0.238*** 
 
(22.88) (23.74) (23.75) (23.04) 
No. Non-Executives 0.080*** 0.020 -0.022 -0.014 
 
(4.42) (1.26) (-1.27) (-0.90) 
Gender -0.025 -0.026 -0.023 -0.029 
 
(-0.59) (-0.61) (-0.55) (-0.67) 
No. Female Non-Executives -0.834*** 
   
 
(-22.10) 
   Dummy Female Non-Executives 
 
-1.035*** 
  
  
(-17.15) 
  Dummy One Female Non-Executive 
  
0.002 
 
   
(0.03) 
 Fraction Female Non-Executives 
   
-0.050*** 
  
   
(-17.36) 
No. Spells 18,967 18,967 18,967 18,967 
No. Failures 6,724 6,724 6,724 6,724 
No. Observations 62,068 62,068 62,068 62,068 
Pseudo R
2
 0.072 0.060 0.048 0.066 
Log Likelihood -9,510 -9,638 -9,762 -9,572 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 19,035 19,291 19,540 19,159 
Stratified (firm-level) yes yes yes yes 
Global Test of PH Assumption (χ2) 4.91 4.18 5.62 4.80 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive turnover likelihoods using Cox proportional hazard models. The 
dependent variable is the hazard rate. Positive coefficients imply an increase of the hazard rate and thus a higher risk 
of turnover while negative coefficients imply a longer expected tenure of the executives in the sample. Z-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for autocorrelation at the firm-
level. All estimations stratified on the firm-level to control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5b: Negative binomial regressions of executive tenure in office  
 
 
Model 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
Return on Assets 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(15.40) (15.55) (15.40) 
Block -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(-0.45) (-0.34) (-0.35) 
Debt Equity Ratio -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 
(-4.99) (-5.07) (-5.13) 
Log Employees 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 
(3.95) (4.17) (4.02) 
No. Executives -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 
(-4.93) (-5.04) (-4.94) 
No. Non-Executives -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 
(-7.58) (-6.73) (-6.48) 
Gender -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.140*** 
 
(-5.68) (-5.54) (-5.64) 
No. Female Non-Executives 0.037*** 
  
 
(4.64) 
  
Dummy Female Non-Executives 
 
0.041*** 
 
  
(2.70) 
 
Fraction Female Non-Executives 
  
0.002*** 
   
(4.36) 
Constant 1.483*** 1.493*** 1.467*** 
 
(37.21) (37.33) (36.20) 
Joint sign. of time dummies χ2 (8) 330.20*** 354.89*** 336.79*** 
Joint sign. of industry dummies χ2 (16) 122.70*** 119.95*** 120.95*** 
Joint sign. of country dummies χ2 (14) 131.06*** 122.14*** 128.38*** 
No. Observations 62,068 62,068 62,068 
Log Likelihood -152,821 -152,853 -152,822 
 
Notes: The table reports estimations of executive tenure. Standard errors clustered at individual-level. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure A1: Joint-endogeneity problem with respect to boards of directors 
 
 
Source: (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) 
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Figure A2: Unitary and dualistic board structures 
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